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A RTICLE XVI of the Texas Constitution has always encouraged arbi-
tration: "It shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as
may be necessary and proper to decide differences by arbitration, when the
parties shall elect that method of trial."1 This provision has been in effect
since 1845, but Texas businessmen are still waiting for such a law to be
passed.
In 1953 Dean Wesley A. Sturges of Yale Law School observed that the
Texas arbitration statute was "not very inviting to parties who may desire
to arbitrate."' Thereafter, prominent Texas lawyers launched a campaign
to persuade the Texas legislature to pass modern arbitration legislation!
In 1965 their efforts were rewarded by passage of a new Texas General
Arbitration Act.4 This law was patterned after the Uniform Arbitration
Act and included some interesting and significant improvements.' Unfor-
tunately, the most important provision was tampered with. Under the
provision as it now stands, use of the existing arbitration machinery is
severely hindered.
For this reason the Texas General Arbitration Act generates curiosity in
other states. I have lectured on arbitration before bar associations from
New Hampshire to Alaska; a description of the exotic provisions of the
Texas Act always produces amusement and incredulity.
I. SOME PECULIAR ADVANTAGES OF THE ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
Before considering the particular defects of the Texas Act, some of the
reasons why arbitration has become popular with the American business-
man are worth reviewing.
In recent years a consistent line of court decisions has encouraged ex-
tensive use of the arbitration process to resolve private, civil disputes.! The
Supreme Court of the United States has participated in this encourage-
ment.' In a 1970 interview Chief Justice Warren Burger said: "We should
encourage, for example, the use of private arbitration for the settlement
of private disputes."'
* A.B,, Yale University; LL.B., Harvard University. Executive Vice President, American Arbi-
tration Association.
' TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 13.
'Sturges, Arbitration Under the Arbitration Statutes of Texas, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 833, 836
(1953).
'See Carrington, The 1965 General Arbitration Statute of Texas, 20 Sw. L.J. 21, 27, and
appendix (1966) [hereinafter cited as Carrington].
4 Texas General Arbitration Act, Tux. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 224-38 (Supp. 1970).
5 Carrington 28-32.
' See "Review of Court Decisions," a regular feature of the Arbitration Journal, New Series.
"Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
' U.S. NEws & WORLD REPoRT, Dec. 14, 1970, at 35.
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The courts of a few states have refused to enforce arbitration clauses,
on the grounds that they "oust the courts of jurisdiction."' But this view,
which purports to be based upon the common law, is rapidly being over-
turned by statute."0 It is precisely because arbitration does "oust the courts"
of unnecessary litigation that arbitration is welcomed by the courts. In the
words of Justice Burger: "One thing an appellate judge learns very quick-
ly is that a large part of all litigation in the courts is an exercise in futility
and frustration. The anomaly is that there are better ways of resolving
private disputes, and we must in the public interest move toward taking a
large volume of private conflicts out of the courts and into the channels of
arbitration.""
The courts are now having to contend with an increasing work load.
Criminal charges, regulatory proceedings, negligence claims, and family
squabbles are forced upon their attention. Many court systems badly need
more judges, better salaries, modern facilities, and advanced management
techniques. But judges are often too busy to win the battle for adequate
funds. Many communities seem unwilling to provide adequate support to
their hard-pressed court systems. Private arbitration operates without
government support. Often the arbitrators contribute their service on
a voluntary basis, and the parties themselves bear the remaining costs. Dis-
putes can be disposed of privately, with no burden upon the traditional
judicial system. In fact, most arbitration cases never come to the attention
of the courts. Trial judges have good reason to favor arbitration.
Arbitration also appeals to businessmen. Arbitration provisions are
commonly found in construction contracts, in buy-and-sell agreements,
and in other business contracts. The American Arbitration Association
administers several of the leading arbitration systems. Last year the twenty-
one offices of the AAA handled over 22,000 arbitration cases, as compared
to about 19,000 in 1969.1" Millions of business contracts now contain AAA
arbitration clauses.
The businessman views arbitration as a logical way to decide contract
disagreements. It permits the parties to obtain an impartial expert and
authorize him to decide disputes over the meaning and application of
their contract. Arbitration is an efficient way to enforce contract obliga-
tions. It creates a "pocket of responsibility," so necessary for the business
climate.
As a commercial tool arbitration has some clear-cut advantages over
the traditional court system. Ordinarily, commerce is conducted across
state and national lines, and the business client does not expect the services
9Lerma v. Allstate Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ind. 1968); Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb.
602, 169 N.W.2d 606 (1969).1 See, e.g., Arkansas Uniform Arbitration Act, AgR. STAT. ANN. S§ 34-511 to -532 (Supp.
1969); Indiana Uniform Arbitration Law, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-277 to -288 (Supp. 1970);
Nevada Uniform Arbitration Act, NEV. REV. STAT. §5 38.010-.205 (1969). South Dakota and
New Mexico passed Uniform Arbitration Acts in the early months of 1971 (session laws not
available at time of going to press).
" ARBrRATION NEWs, No. 6, June 1969, at 5, quoting a speech given at the annual luncheon
of the Minneapolis Advisory Council, at St. Paul, Minnesota, Nov. 1968.
" Official records of the American Arbitration Association provided by the author.
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of his attorney to expire at the border. Lawyers need a system that is in-
dependent of such limitations. By using arbitration, lawyers are able to
leap over jurisdictional boundaries. The lawyer can follow his client's
dispute to its logical place of hearing. He can represent his client without
worrying about compliance with local rules of court practice. These con-
siderations are particularly important for the large enterprise using form
contracts.
Another advantage of arbitration is the privacy enjoyed by the parties.
Most businessmen do not wish to publicize their disputes. Arbitration
satisfies their need.
The businessman also desires simplicity and speed. Arbitration is a one-
shot, final procedure. Using it, the businessman can obtain the advantages
of a binding decision. He knows that he is giving up his right to appeal,
but he relies upon the judgment and impartiality of his chosen arbitrator.
Thus the selection of the arbitrator becomes extremely important. Agencies
such as the American Arbitration Association serve an important function
in this connection."
It seems clear that in the future the use of arbitration by businessmen
will increase. A decision-making system that can hurdle jurisdictional
boundaries will appeal to corporations involved in interstate commerce.
This is particularly true in industries where uniform printed forms are
used. Furthermore, trial lawyers are becoming convinced that arbitration
is a rewarding way to handle many types of litigation. The lawyer can
achieve a higher hourly income in arbitration than in the courts. It is easy
to see why. Hearings are scheduled at the lawyer's convenience, and less
preliminary office work is required. Business logic increasingly will per-
suade businessmen to use arbitration. Most commercial decisions are made
quickly and with little formality by business executives. The businessman
tends to think that contested business decisions should be made in the same
way. The simplicity of the arbitration system has a practical appeal.
II. THE TEXAS GENERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Unfortunately the arbitration law of Texas does not encourage Texas
businessmen to arbitrate their disputes in Texas. The door is locked. Article
224 is the key:
A written agreement concluded upon the advice of counsel to both par-
ties as evidenced by counsels' signatures thereto to submit any existing con-
troversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract concluded upon
the advice of counsel to both parties as evidenced by counsels' signatures
thereto to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between
the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. Provided, how-
ever, that none of the provisions of this Act shall apply to any labor union
contract or to any arbitration agreements or to any arbitrations held pursuant
to agreements between any employer and any employee of that employer or
between their respective representatives, to any contract of insurance or any
", Coulson, Marketing a Modern Arbitration System, 54 JUDICATURE 55 (1970).
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controversy thereunder, or to any construction contract or any document
relating thereto.4
The italicized provisions of this article are the fatal defects in the Texas
law, eliminating any likelihood that business disputes arising in Texas will
be arbitrated there.
A. Unrealistic Requirement that Counsel Sign Contracts
The requirement that parties' counsel sign the agreement as evidence
that it has been executed "upon the advice of counsel" eliminates any sub-
stantial use of arbitration under the statute. This condition was not recom-
mended by the sponsors of the legislation," nor was it a part of the uni-
form law upon which the Texas Act was modeled."6 As was mournfully
reported by Paul Carrington, a leading sponsor of modern arbitration in
Texas:
The new condition is one that is unique among all arbitration statutes.
Standard modern practice is to require that an agreement be in writing of
sufficient clarity that the parties may have the full opportunity of knowing
the effect of the provisions. The 1846 Texas Act went further, as did many
of the earlier arbitration acts in this country, in requiring that the written
agreement be signed by the parties .... It would seem intolerable to Texans
for the legislature to require as a condition to every written contract, that
each party employ a lawyer to sign the contract before it becomes effective.
The invalidity of such a statute under the terms of the Texas constitution
seems clear to this writer.
He urged that this provision be repealed, calling it unfair and unreason-
able." As Mr. Carrington further points out:
[T]he use of printed forms is an important and integral part of the trans-
action of modern business. What is wrong with making a deposit in a bank
under conditions printed on a bank book? What is wrong with a printed sales
order as executed by practically every manufacturer? What is wrong with
printed forms of sales agreements, including warranties, submitted on the
purchase of automobiles and other equipment? Or with printed forms for
insurance policies or for oil leases or for countless other written agreements?
The more complicated the terms and provisions of an agreement, the wiser
is the policy of developing a printed form to which each of the parties can
become accustomed in repetitive transactions of the sort. Specific tailor-made
insertions in all such printed forms, deleting or changing clauses, are con-
sidered by the parties and are made in hundreds of Texas business transactions
daily.'
9
No Texas court has ruled on the question of whether this provision is
unfair. In fact, this and other defects in article 224 have resulted in a
dearth of arbitration cases. One looks in vain for Texas cases interpreting
the law.
'4TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (Supp. 1970) (emphasis added).
11 See Carrington 61.




'Id. at 3 5.
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B. Exemption of Insurance and Construction Contract Disputes
The Texas legislature specifically exempted insurance and construction
contract controversies from the operation of the Act. At one stroke, this
exemption eliminated the two largest categories of arbitration found in
other states.
The arbitration of disputes over liability and damages under the unin-
sured motorist coverage of the family automobile policy constitutes a major
public arbitration system in other parts of the country. Thousands of cases
are arbitrated under this insurance coverage, arbitration having been
proved a sensible way of resolving such disagreements between policy
holders and their insurance companies. Representing claimants and insur-
ance companies in the arbitration of uninsured motorist claims has become
a significant source of income for trial attorneys in other states."0
A parallel growth of cases has occurred in the field of construction
arbitration. The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association are referred to in the general conditions of building
contracts. Arbitration has come to be the generally accepted remedial
procedure for disputes between contractors and owners, between sub-
contractors and contractors, and between design professionals and their
clients. After an extensive survey of industry-wide experience with litiga-
tion and with arbitration, the leading organizations in the construction
industry concluded that it made sense to resolve disputes through arbitra-
tion."5 In the construction industry an obvious need exists: for cases to be
determined by informed and experienced members of the industry since
complex technological issues are ordinarily involved.
The American Arbitration Association now administers over a thousand
such cases each year." In addition to the Accident Claims and Construction
Tribunals administered by the American Arbitration Association, arbitra-
tion is used to resolve many other types of insurance and construction
claims. Sometimes these arbitrations are handled directly by the parties.
Sometimes they are administered by industry associations. The exemptions
written into article 224 of the Texas Act cripple all such systems.
Many prominent Texas lawyers participated in the sponsorship of the
Uniform Arbitration Act. In the late fifties this legislation had been ap-
proved by the American Bar Association. 3 In 1962 the Uniform Act was
successively approved by the Texas State Bar Subcommittee on Arbitration,
the Standing Committee of the Texas State Bar on Uniform State Laws,
the Legislative Committee of the Texas State Bar and finally, by the Board
20 In 1970 more than 12,500 personal injury claims, most of which involved uninsured motorists,
were filed with the American Arbitration Association. Official records provided by the author.
" Aksen, Resolving Construction Contract Disputes Through Arbitration, 23 ARB. J. (n.s.)
141 (1968).
as In 1970, 21,870 claims were filed with the American Arbitration Association. These included
12,875 personal injury claims, mainly under uninsured motorist coverage; 6,337 labor cases; and
2,658 commercial matters. Official records provided by the author.
2a The Uniform Arbitration Act was approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association on August 26, 1955, and August 30, 1956.
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of Directors of the Texas State Bar." None of these various bodies recom-
mended the peculiar restrictions now found in article 224.'
The results of this legislation have not been beneficial to the Texas busi-
ness community. Arbitration has occurred, but not in Texas. Mr. Carring-
ton warned of this: "[T]he lawyers of Texas would enjoy a real benefit
from arbitration conducted in Texas between Texans, but will never
benefit from arbitration between Texans sent to other states in order to
avoid the signatory requirement.""
C. Arbitration Cases Since the 1965 Texas Act
Shortly after passage of the Texas Act, one commentator forecast that
"in the coming years, Texas will be involved in a virtual judicial revolution
-a revolution based upon the increased use of arbitration.""7 Unlikely!
There will be no arbitration practice involving domestic, intrastate con-
tracts in Texas until article 224 is amended.
If the contract involves interstate commerce, of course, the arbitration
clause will probably be enforceable in Texas under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, even if it does involve insurance or construction. ' But as to
domestic, intrastate contract disputes, the Texas Act will encourage par-
ties to specify that arbitration be in Illinois, New York, or any other juris-
diction where sensible arbitration legislation is available. As the above com-
mentator correctly points out: "There is also very little doubt that the
court would compel the parties to arbitrate even though in so doing the
court would be forcing the parties to go to another jurisdiction."' Such
action would be required under article 225 of the Act." Even if an award is
obtained ex parte and subsequently confirmed, all in a foreign jurisdiction,
"a Texas court will enforce the judgment."'" Texas businessmen can easily
obtain the benefits of arbitration by specifying that the arbitration be
exported to a more hospitable jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the party seeking arbitration can enjoin Texas litigation:
Texas will not hesitate to dismiss the cause of action pending arbitration as
agreed upon by the parties. In fact, the court will today go even further in
holding the parties to their agreement. The court will, by mandatory in-
junction, compel the recalcitrant Texan to go into the foreign state to
arbitrate. This change in law represents a dramatic change in attitude by
the public and the courts toward arbitration.
The value of arbitration to businessmen, especially to those whose busi-
ness activity is interstate, is tremendous. Arbitration is also of great value to
the courts. A speedy, efficient and impartial means of relief is provided for the




21 Comment, Interstate Arbitration Agreements and the General Arbitration Act of 1965, 19
BAYLOR L. REV. 88, 89 (1967).
21 United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §5 1-14 (1964).
2 Comment, supra note 27, at 98.
20TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 225(A) (Supp. 1970).
3'Comment, supra note 27, at 106.
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otherwise be. It is no wonder that the courts are no longer jealous of the
arbitrators.'
Thus, we find the Texas Act forcing Texans to arbitrate in other states,
but in many situations failing to encourage parties to arbitrate in Texas.
As an attempt to protect the interests of Texans, article 224 is a dismal
failure.
In his 1953 article Dean Sturges reported that "Texas courts have done
their part to make the general arbitration statute a useful facility for the
arbitration of causes."' My own review of recent arbitration cases in Texas
convinces me that Texas courts still view arbitration favorably.
In Browvn v. Eubank4 the court held that an agreement to arbitrate,
adopted by court order, was binding on both parties. The case involved a
boundary dispute. After an initial judgment was reversed and remanded
on appeal," the parties agreed to select arbitrators. It was understood that
the trial judge would select the third arbitrator, who was to be a land
surveyor licensed in another county. The court approved the settlement
agreement. Almost two years later the trial judge selected an impartial
arbitrator, but he was a surveyor licensed in the county of jurisdiction.
The claimant's attorney complained about the appointment, but continued
to participate in the proceedings. A field report of the majority of the arbi-
trators was filed with the court. Only then did the claimant attempt to
withdraw from the arbitration. The respondent sought judgment on the
award. Under Texas common law either party could revoke a submission
to arbitration any time before the award was rendered.' The arbitration
submission in this case had been entered into prior to the passage of the
1965 Texas Act. In order to validate this award, the court had to make new
law: "It has been held in other jurisdictions that arbitration agreements
which would otherwise be considered common-law submissions, when made
under a 'rule of court,' are irrevocable. No Texas case to that effect has
come to our attention, but in our opinion the reasoning underlying the
doctrine is sound and should be recognized here."' The court held that the
arbitration agreement here was "more than a mere common-law con-
tract." Citing authorities from other states, the court ruled that the at-
tempted withdrawal from the arbitration was ineffectual.
In another recent case, REA Express v. Missouri Pacific R.R.," the court
of civil appeals indicated that an arbitration agreement in a contract in-
volving interstate commerce would be enforceable in a Texas court under
the Federal Arbitration Act.0 The defendant operated trains across state
boundaries, and the disputed contract clearly concerned interstate com-
"oid. at I10.
"3 Sturges, supra note 2, at 864.
34443 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
"Brown v. Eubank, 378 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964), error ref. m.r.e.
"s Deep South Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Corp., 328 S.W.2d 897, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1959), error ref. #.r.e.
7443 S.W.2d at 389.
3'8 d. at 390.
38447 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
40 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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merce. The court held that the statement of national law declaring an
arbitration agreement in such a contract to be valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable was "equally applicable in state or federal courts."'" Unfortu-
nately by participating in the litigation and by failing to file a demand
for arbitration until almost twenty-seven months after the filing of the
cross action, the plaintiff had waived its right to arbitrate. Nevertheless,
this opinion indicates the readiness of Texas courts to enforce an arbitration
agreement in a contract involving interstate commerce.
In Carpenter v. North River Insurance Co.' the court of civil appeals
upheld an award in a common-law arbitration where the respondent failed
to prove that it had made a timely withdrawal. Plaintiff sought to reduce
an uninsured motorist arbitration award to judgment. The trial court had
dismissed the case, accepting the company's allegation that the Texas Act
precluded the arbitration of disputes growing out of insurance policies. The
trial court was reversed on the basis that the company had failed to sustain
its burden of proving that it had withdrawn from the arbitration. The
Texas Act was held not to be the exclusive procedure for arbitration in
Texas. "The settlement of disputes by arbitration is favored in the law of
Texas. The statutes relating to arbitration and award should be construed
liberally in keeping with that principle."' Because statutory arbitration
was not held to be the exclusive method of arbitrating disputes, and since
the common-law arbitration had resulted in an award, judgment was given
on the award.'
It was noted that since 1895 another arbitration statute"' had specifically
provided for disputes between employers and employees. No language in
that statute reserved to the parties the right to arbitrate under a common-
law agreement. Nevertheless, in Waco Transit Corp. v. Local 276, TWU 4
a non-statutory arbitrator's award in a labor dispute was upheld.
The above cases indicate that, wherever possible, Texas courts are willing
to uphold arbitration agreements on the basis that: (1) the agreement was
a "rule of court"; (2) the contract comes under the coverage of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act; and (3) the respondent failed to withdraw from a
common-law arbitration in timely fashion. Texas courts have held that ar-
bitration should be "favored."' Furthermore, the Texas Constitution re-
quires the legislature to pass a "necessary and proper" arbitration law.'
For all of the above reasons and more it would seem to be appropriate for
the Texas legislature to modernize article 224 of the Texas General Arbi-
tration Act. To do this requires only the replacement of the present article
224 with section 1 of the Uniform Law:
4' 447 S.W.2d at 726.
4 436 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
4
31d. at 553.
44 Earlier cases (e.g., Huntington Corp. v. Inwood Constr. Co., 348 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1961), error ref. n.r.e.), have distinguished arbitrations that have resulted in awards and
mere agreements to arbitrate. The latter are considered to be void as against public policy.
4 TEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. arts. 239-49 (1969); see 436 S.W.2d at 553; Sturges, supra
note 2, at 839.
46 402 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966), error ref. n.r.e.4TBrazoria County v. Knutson, 142 Tex. 172, 176 S.W.2d 740 (1943).
4' Tx. CONST. art. XVI, § 13.
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Section 1. (Validity of Arbitration Agreement.) A written agreement to
submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written
contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between
the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract ....
Such a change would carry out the intent of section 21 of the Uniform
Act, already included in the Texas Act as article 238-3: "This Act shall
be construed as to effectuate its general purpose and make uniform the con-
struction of those articles and sections that are enacted into the law of
arbitration proceedings of other states."' Article 224 is presently incon-
sistent with every other arbitration statute passed in other states. A review
of these statutes shows that exceptions are rare. Indiana excludes "consum-
er" disputes. Such a review also highlights the uniqueness of the "counsel
signature" provision of the Texas Act.'
III. CONCLUSION
Until the Texas General Arbitration Act is amended, it will continue to
stand as an impediment to the arbitration of domestic, intrastate disputes
in Texas. Thousands of arbitration clauses placed in business contracts by
unsuspecting merchants will be invalidated by the exceptions of article
224. The expectations of the leading Texas attorneys who sponsored this
legislation, will be frustrated. Furthermore, sophisticated parties will con-
tinue to provide in their contracts for arbitration in other jurisdictions,
thereby depriving Texas lawyers of an opportunity to resolve commercial
disputes within their own jurisdiction. The problem can be solved very
easily by amending article 224. The language originally recommended by
the Texas Bar Association should replace the present, defective provision.
Surely it is time for the Texas legislature to bring its "modern" arbitration
law in line with other commercial states.
" UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT 5 1.
5OTEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 238-4 (Supp. 1970).
,1 Id. art. 224; see text accompanying notes 16-19 supra. Comparison may be made with the
following state statutes: ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.010-.180 (Supp. 1970); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-1501 to -1516 (Supp. 1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. 55 34-501 to -510 (1962); CAL. CIV.
PRO. CODE 55 1280-94 (West. Supp. 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-408 to -424 (1958);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §5 682.01-22 (Supp. 1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 658-1 to -15 (1968);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 101 (1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §5 3-201 to -220 (1968); LA. REV.
STAT. §§ 4201-17 (1951); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 881-960 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 7, § 1-23 (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, 5§ 1-19 (1968); MICH. COMp. LAWS
§5 600.5001-.5035 (1968); MICH. SUP. CT. R. 769; MINN. STAT. 55 572.08-.30 (Supp. 1970);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 38.010-.205 (1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-:10 (1955); N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. LAW § 7501 (McKinney 1963); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01-.15 (Page Supp.
1970); ORE. REV. STAT. §5 3.210-.340 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 1-181 (1963); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. 55 10-3-1 to 10-3-20 (1969); VA. CODE ANN. 55 8-503 to -507 (1957);
WASH. REV. CODE 55 7.04-010 to -220 (1961); WIs. STAT. 55 298.01-18 (1958); WYo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1-1025 to -1048 (Supp. 1969).
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